Might v. Right: Charles Taylor and the Sierra Leone Special Court by Ward, Kathy
Human Rights Brief
Volume 11 | Issue 1 Article 3
2003
Might v. Right: Charles Taylor and the Sierra Leone
Special Court
Kathy Ward
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/hrbrief
Part of the Human Rights Law Commons, and the International Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ American
University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Human Rights Brief by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons
@ American University Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact fbrown@wcl.american.edu.
Recommended Citation
Ward, Kathy. "Might v. Right: Charles Taylor and the Sierra Leone Special Court." Human Rights Brief 11, no. 1 (2003): 8-11.
8N JUNE 2003, THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE
( Special Court) announced it had indicted Liberian Pre s i d e n t
Charles Taylor on war crimes charges related to his role in the
war in Sierra Leone. The announcement came just as Ta y l o r
a r r i ved in Ghana for peace talks, which diplomats hoped would bring a
quick end to the Liberian war and would provide Taylor with a graceful
exit from powe r. When news of the indictment broke, Taylor ru s h e d
back to Liberia to avoid the possibility of arrest in Ghana.  Although the
peace talks quickly resumed without Ta y l o r, accusations flew that the
C o u rt had ruined the best chance for quick peace in Liberia.  A mael-
s t rom of conflicting re p o rts and opinions left many confused as to
whether the indictment was separate from or a part of larger political
e f f o rts to re m ove Ta y l o r. 
Now officially in exile in Nigeria, Taylor—a successful coup leader,
f u g i t i ve from justice in the U.S., and winner of dubious presidential elec-
tions in Liberia—now hopes to evade the Court, where he faces serious
charges related to his connections with rebels in Sierra Leone.  De s p i t e
the political effects of the indictment, the indictment is the act of an
a u t h o r i zed criminal investigator and the product of efforts to bring the
rule of law to bear on those most responsible for the horrors of the Si e r r a
Leone civil war. While Charles Taylor has temporarily eluded the re a c h
of the Court, this article discusses how he came to be in his present situ-
ation and the ways in which legal proceedings and political efforts have
and will continue to interact in the future .
THE SETTING: THE WAR IN SIERRA LEONE, THE CREATION
OF THE SPECIAL COURT AND THE RISING RECOGNITION OF
CHARLES TAYLOR’S ROLE
THE WARS OF THE SMALLER NATIONS of West Africa normally do not
attract much international attention. An earlier incarnation of the
Liberian civil war in the early 1990s led to a West African peacekeeping
f o rce that later conve rted into a UN peacekeeping force. But it was not
until the media bombarded the international community with images of
civilian victims of the Sierra Leone re b e l s’ amputation campaigns that
leadership beyond West Africa began to invest significant time and
re s o u rces to re s o l ve the re g i o n’s conflicts. The UN Security Council
a p p roved a significant peacekeeping force for Sierra Leone. When it
failed, Britain stepped in with its own forces to re s t o re stability and to
g i ve the UN force a second life. No t a b l y, these events led world leaders
to conclude that there could be no lasting peace for Sierra Leone without
a means of bringing those to justice most responsible for the atrocities in
the civil war.   Looking to create a court that would achieve this mission
and provide international legitimacy without the bureaucracy of the ad
hoc tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, the Se c u r i t y
Council approved the creation of a hybrid Special Court. This Court
would combine international and Sierra Leonean staff and rely on vo l u n-
t a ry funding to fulfill its mandate to “p rosecute persons who bear the
g reatest responsibility for serious violations of  international humanitari-
an law and Sierra Leonean law committed in the territory of Sierra Leone
since 30 November 1996.” 
At about the same time the UN Security Council began to take
serious action on the war in Sierra Leone, some Council members also
turned their attention to Liberia. Growing recognition that Taylor and
his regime lay at the heart of the widening spiral of fighting in the re g i o n
d e veloped into a movement to confront him. The initial result was a
series of economic measures imposed by the Security Council. T h e s e
m e a s u res included an arms embargo, diamond embargo, and a travel ban
against Taylor and other members of his inner circle. The hope was that
these measures would strangle the flow of arms that fueled Ta y l o r’s mili-
t a ry activities in the region, and that the diamond and travel bans would
limit his funding and force him to stop fueling rebel wars in neighboring
countries. Un f o rt u n a t e l y, the arms embargo was never fully enforc e d ,
diamond smuggling continued, other sources of Ta y l o r’s income
remained untouched, and the fighting persisted. 
While international frustration with Taylor grew, the Sierra Leone
Special Court began its work by setting up its operations in re c o rd time
and announcing indictments that clarified the Pro s e c u t o r’s intent to
indict the most senior leadership of all parties responsible for the atro c i-
ties in the Sierra Leone war. While the earliest indictments we re of Si e r r a
Leonean citizens, the Court’s mandate granted it broader indictment
p owers. Prosecutor David Crane, through statements and the early
indictments, started accusing Taylor of being the center point of a joint
criminal enterprise.
At the same time, governments of neighboring countries explore d
other means of re m oving Ta y l o r. Fo l l owing Taylor's practice of support-
ing rebel movements abroad to destabilize neighboring gove r n m e n t s ,
Ta y l o r’s opponents backed two Liberian rebel groups in their campaigns
to oust Ta y l o r. The largest rebel gro u p, Liberians United for
Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD), re c e i ved support from Gu i n e a ,
which eventually allowed it to reach the outskirts of the Liberian capital
of Mo n rovia. T h e re was also significant evidence that Sierra Leone pro-
vided assistance to LURD and speculation that the United States had
p rovided some form of support as well. The smaller Liberian rebel gro u p,
the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL), found backing in
Cote d’ Ivo i re and eventually took control of significant stretches of
Liberia, including the second city of Buchanan.  These campaigns gre a t-
ly reduced Ta y l o r’s control over the country, effectively restricting his firm
grasp to little more than Mo n rovia. By the middle of this ye a r, LU R D
f o rces we re regularly threatening the capital area itself. 
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9Ta y l o r, howe ve r, continued to demonstrate a keen ability to surv i ve
t h rough a tight grip on political powe r, sanctions busting, and a series of
c o n venient alliances.  It  remained unclear whether the rebel move m e n t s
would unseat him. Mo re ove r, many members of the international com-
munity worried that a military victory by either rebel party would not
bring Liberia real peace and a better government. Seizing on Ta y l o r’s
weakened position, regional and Western diplomats, including those
f rom the United States, launched intensified efforts to reinvigorate the
Liberian peace process.  During the year diplomats found glimmers of
hope in re p o rted plans by Taylor to commit to the peace process and to
a d d ress serious problems in Liberian governance, including security sec-
tor reform. Combined with the added pre s s u re from the rebel military
campaigns, international diplomats built arrangements for a new ro u n d
of peace talks involving all the major parties.  By June, the stage was set
for top-level negotiations in Accra, Ghana. West African leaders and U.S.
diplomats undertook a concerted campaign to convince Taylor to person-
ally participate in the Accra talks. Taylor agreed. Some diplomats consid-
e red the Accra talks the best chance in years to create a peaceable, durable
solution for Liberia that could also re m ove Taylor by allowing him a
graceful exit from the presidency as part of a negotiated settlement.
THE INDICTMENT
AS M I L I TA RY A N D D I P LO M AT I C WO R K H E AT E D U P, so did the
Pro s e c u t o r’s work at the Sierra Leone Special Court. By early 2003, the
C o u rt had already announced the indictments of senior leaders of both
rebel and pro - g overnment groups in Sierra Leone. Taylor loomed as an
un-indicted kingpin in the rebel network, yet Prosecutor Cr a n e ' s
repeated on-the-re c o rd statements made his interest in Taylor unmis-
takable. Ta y l o r’s potential indictment was also discussed in off-the-
re c o rd meetings.
THE INDICTMENT PROCESS OF THE SPECIAL COURT
The Special Court’s indictment process is like that of the ad hoc
international tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. T h e
Prosecutor conducts investigations of possible indictees. If he or she
determines there is “sufficient evidence to provide reasonable gro u n d s
for believing that the suspect has committed a crime [within the Court’s
jurisdiction],” he or she may pre p a re an indictment. The pro s e c u t o r
then assembles the outline of the case into a proposed indictment and
submits the draft indictment to the presiding trial judge for re v i ew.  T h e
p rosecutor also submits a proposed arrest warrant. The presiding judge
then decides whether to approve the indictment and warrant. T h e re is
intentionally no role for politicians in the process. Si m i l a r l y, the powe r
to request an amendment subsequent to an approved indictment re s t s
solely with the pro s e c u t o r. 
In defining the responsibility of the pro s e c u t o r, the Statute of the
Special Court specifically states, “[h]e or she shall not seek or re c e i ve
i n s t ructions from any Government or from any other source.”  In other
w o rds, while its work may have political effects, the task of the pro s e c u-
tor of the Special Court is a legal one and is limited to events in the Si e r r a
Leone war. The prosecutor does not have the authority to alter his other
actions based on the dictates of politicians invo l ved in diplomatic effort s
to bring lasting peace to Liberia. Si m i l a r l y, diplomats do not have the
authority to order indictments or cut deals with indictees to re m ove or
reduce the charges against them. That authority rests with the Court and
p a rticularly with the pro s e c u t o r.  This separation of authorities—and the
insulation of the criminal legal process from the vagaries of politics—is
a critical component  to ensure the trials resulting in ve rdicts will help
m ove Sierra Leone from a cycle of violence to a more stable enviro n m e n t
in which law provides an alternative to gun barrel justice. 
The Special Court does not have its own police force to enforce its
a r rest warrants. It also does not have a mandate under Chapter VII of
the United Nations Chart e r, meaning that it cannot rely on its mandate
to compel governments to arrest indictees wanted by the court .
T h e re f o re, the Special Court is largely reliant upon the good will of gov-
ernments to execute its arrest warrants.
The prosecutor of the Special Court, like his Rwanda and former
Yugoslav counterparts, has the power to keep an approved indictment
“sealed.”  Ap p roved indictments may be kept under wraps if, for exam-
ple, the prosecutor believes public knowledge of the indictment could
significantly undermine the likelihood of obtaining custody of the
indictee. This was the case in Ta y l o r’s indictment. As presiding judge of
the Special Court Trial Chamber, Judge Bankole Thompson signed
Ta y l o r’s indictment on Ma rch 3, 2003 and his arrest (and transfer) war-
rant on Ma rch 7, 2003. The Court kept the indictment sealed, explain-
ing later that because Taylor was a sitting head of state and the subject of
a United Nations Security Council travel ban, it waited for one of
Ta y l o r’s infrequent known trips out of Liberia in the hope that the coun-
t ry he visited would assist the Court in executing the warrant.
The prosecutor believed that the June peace talks in Accra cre a t e d
that opport u n i t y. As part of a larger study of the Special Court, the
International Crisis Group learned the following facts: 
The Court gave 24 hours’ notice to diplomatic missions and UN
security in Mo n rovia, that the Prosecutor intended to announce
the Taylor indictment when it was clear that he was traveling to
Accra. In a June 4 press release, the Court’s Registrar stated that
“copies of all the re l e vant documents we re served this morning per-
sonally on the Ghanaian High Commissioner in Fre e t own. In
addition, copies of those documents we re electronically transmit-
ted to the Ghanaian Mi n i s t ry of Fo reign Affairs and acknow l e d g e-
ment of receipt of those documents has been re c e i ved by telephone
f rom a senior official in that ministry. 
That same day, a Ghanaian Fo reign Mi n i s t ry official denied re c e i v i n g
any documents relating to the arrest warrant. The Court said it did not
notify Ghana earlier because it could not be certain officials would not
warn Ta y l o r.  
It is important to note that this is not the first time an internation-
al court has indicted an individual for war crimes committed as a sitting
head of state. The International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia (ICTY) established this precedent when it indicted Sl o b o d a n
Milosevic, who now stands on trial in The Hague on war crimes charges.
The ICTY statue expressly states that “The official position of any
accused person, whether as Head of State or Government or as a re s p o n-
sible Government official, shall not re l i e ve such person of criminal
responsibility nor mitigate punishment.” The Special Court’s statute
includes a similar provision that is even clearer:  “The official position of
any accused persons, whether as Head of State or Government or as a
responsible government official, shall not re l i e ve such person of criminal
responsibility nor mitigate punishment.” 
The situation around the release of the Taylor indictment was eve n
m o re complicated. T h e re was substantial evidence that Western diplo-
mats also helped convince Taylor to attend the Accra peace talks and
p ressed Ghana to guarantee his immunity. The pro s e c u t o r, rightly, was
not part of this process. Thus, by the time Taylor boarded a plane to
Accra, the political and legal processes had competing demands. T h e
political process wanted Taylor free and protected so he could part i c i p a t e
in the talks that the diplomats hoped would bring peace to Liberia.
While the Special Court wanted him seized during this unusual trip out
of the country and saw the trip as perhaps the only chance it would have
to secure help in obtaining custody of Ta y l o r. Howe ve r, it is also impor-
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tant to remember that on a deeper level both processes had the common
goal of re m oving Taylor from powe r. While some diplomats appare n t l y
dismissed the Taylor indictment as naïve, the common goal remained. 
In the end, the Ghanaians did not detain Taylor and instead allowe d
him to return to Liberia. The fighting continued and the humanitarian
crisis worsened until a new round of diplomatic and military efforts eve n-
tually led to a deal in which Taylor went into exile in Nigeria. The details
of the exile agreement we re not made public, although they are general-
ly taken to include a ban on Taylor participating in the governance of
Liberia while in exile. Some Nigerian officials publicly declared that part
of the deal was that the international community would not press the
g overnment of Nigeria to turn Taylor over to the Special Court .
Some analysts believe the way in which the indictment was
unsealed prolonged the war. They think Taylor really was ready to give
up power and keep his promises, despite his long track re c o rd of lying
and clinging to power through any means. Others disagree, citing that
same track re c o rd (and now Ta y l o r’s subsequent behavior in exile), as evi-
dence that the Accra talks we re not likely to produce the results the
diplomats sought.
WHAT DOES THE STATUS QUO MEAN?
SINCE TAYLOR WENT INTO EXILE, a rocky form of peace has been
established in parts of Liberia. Vice president Moses Blah has taken ove r
the presidency and is the caretaker of the government until a longer-term
transitional government takes over later this ye a r. West African tro o p s
h a ve established a level of control over Mo n rovia, although most of the
c o u n t ry remains beyond their reach and there is evidence of continued
fighting.  The UN Security Council has passed a resolution authorizing
a UN mission in Liberia, including the deployment of up to 15,000 UN
peacekeepers. UN Se c re t a ry - General Kofi Annan has appointed Ja c q u e s
Klein to run this UN operation. Klein held a number of international
leadership positions in the Balkans, including serving as the UN
Se c re t a ry - Ge n e r a l’s Special Re p re s e n t a t i ve and Coordinator of UN
Operations in Bosnia. Klein appears ready to use the strong leadership
style he honed in the Balkans to take control of the UN mission and to
bring about stability and pro g ress as quickly as possible. 
Dealing with Charles Taylor is a critical part of Klein’s vision of sta-
b i l i t y. The media has re p o rted that Taylor has been trying to keep his
hand in Liberian affairs—including the running of the gove r n m e n t —
f rom his exile in Nigeria. This led Nigerian President Obasanjo to speak
to Taylor in mid-Se p t e m b e r, warning him that these activities must stop.
At the same time, Klein has called Ta y l o r’s continued presence at large a
t h reat to peace in Liberia and has already started to press for his turnove r
to the Special Court .
That Taylor has continued to interf e re in Liberia despite his pro m-
ises and his exile deal should come as no surprise. His personal history
of lying and clinging to power would have made a complete bre a k
u n l i k e l y. Mo re ove r, he operates in an environment where pledges and
laws have had little success at truly controlling the actions of political
and military leaders. The rule of law has had ve ry limited influence in
this enviro n m e n t .
In short, the continuation of the current status quo promises to
h a ve a negative effect on both Liberia and Sierra Leone. It leaves at large
the man most responsible for the Liberian crisis and it leaves him beyo n d
the reach of the Special Court. It sends a message to Sierra Leoneans that
the rule of law does not apply to those who wield the most control and
the perception that accountability is only for underlings. It also leaves the
people of Liberia with the impression that yet another corrupt Liberian
leader is beyond the reach of the laws of Liberia and the laws of the inter-
national community. This impression undermines the rule of law.
The deal also leaves the Government of Nigeria with a distasteful
houseguest that many Nigerians would rather not have in their country.
Palpable tension remains between Taylor and many Nigerians who still
hold him responsible for the deaths of Nigerian peacekeepers the last
time Nigeria intervened to stop fighting in Liberia. Now, the Ni g e r i a n
g overnment is pre vented by Taylor's immunity from bringing charges
related to those deaths and is stuck defending Ta y l o r’s ve ry comfort a b l e
life in a villa in Nigeria free from fear of prosecution. 
Fi n a l l y, the current situation sends a potentially dangerous message
to others who might consider leadership by thuggery in Liberia. The les-
son is that if you are bad enough and powe rful enough, you can ignore
the law and negotiate a comfortable exile. It is perhaps too early to tell
what effect this will have on "little Taylors"—people who would choose
to ignore the law in Liberia on a smaller scale. With a largely destroye d
justice system disrespected throughout the Taylor regime, there seems lit-
tle doubt that the rule of law faces an uphill battle in Liberia, not to men-
tion that Ta y l o r’s current situation does little to encourage good behavior
by others.
TAYLOR BEHIND BARS:  CAN THE STATUS QUO BE
CHANGED?
MANY ANALYSTS HAVE ASKED if things could have gone differe n t l y
when Taylor went to Ghana in June. Had Kofi Annan interve n e d — we a r-
ing his dual hats as UN Se c re t a ry - General and as a respected Gh a n a i a n —
perhaps Ghana would have detained Ta y l o r. Howe ve r, as ICG fairly
noted, it probably would not have resulted in an arrest. St rong links of
solidarity and brotherhood among West African heads of state meant
that one West African president would not easily hand another over to
the Special Court .
Gi ven Ta y l o r’s behavior in Nigeria, the deal with him should be
c o n s i d e red null and void. It is hard to imagine how Ta y l o r’s interf e re n c e
f rom exile in the governance of Liberia could be anything but a violation
of the first ord e r. The whole point of his exile was to take him out of the
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p i c t u re in Liberia.  Nigeria and others invo l ved in the deal may feel they
a re in an awkward position now. But they should not feel that way.
Ta y l o r’s behavior, by any rules of agreement, releases them from any
obligations they made to shield him from the Court. In fact, they should
see Ta y l o r’s behavior as the perfect excuse to bring Taylor to justice
b e f o re the Court .
A Chapter VII UN Security Council resolution would make the
job even easier for the politicians in view of the earlier exile deal. If the
Security Council acted under its coerc i ve Chapter VII authority and
o rd e red all member states to cooperate with the Special Court, including
turning over indictees on their territory, the Nigerians would have anoth-
er way of justifying Taylor's turnove r. They could also use such a re s o l u-
tion as leverage to press Taylor to “vo l u n t a r i l y” turn himself in. Gi ve n
Ta y l o r’s track re c o rd, that last scenario seems unlikely unless he adopts
the pose of a wronged victim who submitted himself to the Special Court
in order to further peace in Liberia.
Bringing Taylor to face the charges at the Special Court would send
an important message throughout the region. It would make it clear that
p ower does not buy immunity from charges for war crimes. It would set
an important precedent by holding a leader accountable for criminal
charges and demonstrate that leaders are subject to the law. It may also
h a ve a deterrent effect on others who would use similar tactics to furt h e r
their personal goals, and who, based on the impunity that has reigned to
date, would otherwise not fear being held accountable before the law.
In short, options still exist that could bring Taylor before the Sp e c i a l
C o u rt and put him behind bars. And while the passage of time may make
it easier to take these steps, there is little good reason to wait. What is
most re q u i red is a level of will and backbone on the part of key We s t
African governments and the West (including the United St a t e s ) .
Whether that exists remains to be seen. But until that backbone is found
the stability of Liberia and the prospects for the rule of law in Liberia and
Sierra Leone will suffer.  H R B
Kathy Ward is the Deputy Director of the Washington Office of the International
Crisis Group.
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